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Chapter 17
Shifting Focus: Towards Outcome-Based Policy and Regulation Making for
Maritime Safety and Vessel-Source Pollution in Canada
Aldo Chircop and Eric Machum*

17.1. Introduction
A recent publication concluded that “… Canadian water transportation policy is
a history of: laissez faire; protection, financing and subsidization; government
operation, ownership and privatization; expanded protection; commercialization; and a market oriented philosophy.”1 Consistent with this larger policy
process, subsidiary policy and regulation making for maritime safety and
vessel-source pollution in Canada have followed the roller-coaster pattern,
punctuated by parallel milestones.
This contribution is a survey and analysis of current Canadian directions
for domestic maritime safety and vessel-source pollution regimes.
Contemporary Canadian policy and regulation making are guided by outcomebased approaches formulated on the basis of risk assessment.2 The chapter
seeks to identify and explain the reasons for contemporary Canadian policy and
regulatory directions and the philosophy guiding them with reference to the
broader international context. In particular, appropriate comparisons are drawn
*

The authors are indebted to the following persons for their assistance with various research
queries: Dr. Mary Brooks, Professor of Marketing and Transportation and William A. Black
Chair of Commerce, Faculty of Management, Dalhousie University; Ross MacDonald,
Manager, Special Projects and Arctic Shipping –AMSRP, Transport Canada; Valerie Devlin,
A/Director, Seaway & Domestic Shipping Policy – ACFS, Transport Canada; Mark Covan,
Senior Counsel (Practitioner), Public Prosecution Service of Canada, Atlantic Regional Office,
Halifax, Nova Scotia; Bud Streeter, Vice President, Marine Manager for Canada, Lloyd’s
Register North America, Inc.; Allan MacLean, Director, Conservation and Protection, Fisheries
and Oceans Canada, Maritimes Region; David Michels, Dalhousie Law Library.
1
J. Monteiro, and G. Robertson, “Milestones in Canadian Transportation Policy – Water and
Highway – Part II” (Paper presented to the Canadian Transportation Research Forum, “North
American Networks: Gaps and Opportunities,” Proceedings of the 42nd Annual Conference,
Winnipeg, Manitoba, 3–6 June 2007), p. 580.
2
At the time of writing the federal Department of Transport (Transport Canada) is planning to
review the 1995 National Marine Policy and to update the Marine Safety “Strategic Plan for the
period 2008–2015,” to be known as “The New Wave.” Valerie Devlin, Senior Advisor,
Transport Canada, pers. comm. (26 June 2008).
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with counterpart practices of the European Union. The foci include the
Canadian approach to national maritime transport policy making,
the institutional framework of Canada’s maritime administration, the process of
reform of Canadian shipping regulation for maritime safety and marine
pollution purposes culminating in a new shipping act, the strengthening of
legislation and creation of penal offences to combat illegal ship discharges,
places of refuge for ships in need of assistance, the use of shipping regulatory
tools to address marine conservation concerns, supervision of classification
societies, and the oil pollution liability and compensation regime. The study
concludes with insights into the contemporary maritime policy and regulation
in Canada.

17.2. Context
Bordering on three oceans (Atlantic, Arctic, and Pacific) and the Great Lakes,
Canada is a major trading nation, but not necessarily a seafaring nation.
The bulk of Canadian trade is with the United States, much of which is by way
of surface transportation.3 Whereas maritime cargo in 2005 accounted for 39.7
percent of the volume of Canadian international trade, it accounted for only
12.5 percent of the total value of that trade.4 In addition, Canada has a very
small flag fleet,5 having made a deliberate policy choice not to provide
incentives for shipping (other than for shipbuilding and cabotage), thus relying
on international shipping (generally foreign-flagged) to carry the majority of its

3

In 2007, approximately 59% of the value of trade with the United States was carried by trucks.
Transport Canada, Transportation in Canada: An Overview (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works
and Government Services, 2007), p. 5.
4
Excluding trade with the United States, maritime traffic represented 45.2% of the value and
83.2% of the volume of Canadian international trade. See WTO, “Trade Policy Review:
Canada,” WTO Press Release No. PRESS/TPRB/280 (WTO, 21 March 2007), available:
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp280_e.htm> (retrieved 10 November 2008), para.
159. See also Transport Canada, Transportation in Canada 2007 Annual Report Addendum,
TP 13198E (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services, 2007) [hereinafter
Transportation in Canada 2007], Tables “EC6: Modal Shares in Canada-United States Trade,
1997–2007” and “EC7: Canada/Other Countries Trade, by Mode and Sector, 1997–2007.” All
hyperlinks last viewed 12 November 2008.
5
Transportation in Canada 2007, n. 4 above at Table M15: Canadian-Registered Fleet by
Type, 1987, 1997, 2007. The Canadian fleet is comprised of 182 vessels with a total registered
tonnage of 2.2M tonnes. Dry bulk carriers make up over half the tonnage (1M), with tankers
(515) and ferries (428) sharing the remaining majority.
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trade.6 Accordingly, Canada is a continental state in which “shipping is not
something that appears to rank very high in government priorities even though
it is an essential element of Canadian trade and economy.”7 That may still be
true of commercial shipping. However, for risk assessment purposes, the
increasing numbers and importance of fishing vessels and recreational boating
registered and/or operating in Canadian waters have justified focused attention
and new directions for Canadian maritime regulators. Every year there are
many recreational boating accidents resulting in death, injury or property loss.8
Another significant contextual factor for Canadian maritime
transportation law and policy is the constitutional framework. Since
confederation in 1867, navigation and shipping have been federal subjectmatter so that maritime legislation has essentially consisted of federal law,
despite a period during which provincial law was applied in a maritime law
setting.9 Canadian maritime law draws very heavily from international maritime
law and its judicial development takes into consideration this essentially
international character and the need for international uniformity.10 However,
federal and provincial courts have generally common responsibilities for the
administration of Canadian maritime law, irrespective of the location, types or
flags of vessels involved.11

6

Transport Canada, A Shipping Policy for Canada, TP 1676 (Ottawa: Transport Canada,
Marine, 1979), p. 1; see also Monteiro and Robertson, n. 1 above, p. 581 (Stating that “in 1949,
the government concluded that Canada was not justified in maintaining a Canadian flag deep
sea fleet via subsidies or preferential tax treatment for shipowners and operators, a policy which
has not changed to date”).
7
E. Gold, A. Chircop, and H. Kindred, Maritime Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2003), p. 23.
8
Every year some 150 persons die from boating accidents in Canada. See Transport Canada,
Safe Boating Guide 2006, TP 511 (01/2008) (Ottawa: Transport Canada, Office of Boating
Safety, 2008), p. 6, available: <http://www.fedpubs.com/subject/boat/safe_boating_guide.htm>
(retrieved 30 March 2009). Statistics concerning accidents from other vessels are reported in:
Transportation in Canada 2007, n. 4 above at Tables “S14: Marine Occurrences, 2002–2007”
and “S17: Small Canadian Vessels Engaged in Fishing Activity Marine Occurrences, 1997–
2007.”
9
Quebec North Shore Paper Co. v. Canadian Pacific Ltd., [1977] 2 S.C.R. 1054, McNamara
Construction (Western) Ltd. v. R., [1977] 2 S.C.R. 654, and Zavarovalna Skupnost Triglav
(Insurance Community Triglav Ltd.) v. Terrasses Jewellers Inc., [1983] 1 S.C.R. 283, followed
by ITO International Terminal Operators Ltd. v. Miida Electronics Inc. (The Buenos Aires
Maru), [1986] 1 S.C.R. 752, and Ordon Estate v. Grail, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 437.
10
Gold et al., n. 7 above, pp. 115–117.
11
Federal Courts Act, R.S., 1985, c. F-7, s. 22(1) & (3).
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17.3. The Multiple Layers of Canadian Maritime Policy Making
Canadian maritime policy has a problematique involving multiple layers of
federal policy making processes. On one level, there is departmental policy,
which is developed at the highest level of the department and frequently also at
the unit level within the department. There are also policies of departments that
share ocean responsibilities and which may overlap with the Department of
Transport’s (Transport Canada) mandate, and that in turn may lead to interdepartmental policies. Overarching departmental policies are national policies
concerning sustainable development, modern comptrollership and other matters
imposed on all line departments by the Office of the Prime Minister and/or the
Treasury Board of Canada. For example, the Treasury Board’s Management
Accountability Framework has had a far-reaching effect on the formulation of
departmental policies, including maritime transport policy.12
Although ostensibly setting out a framework for integrated oceans
management, the Oceans Strategy13 and accompanying Oceans Action Plan14
considered by other contributors in this project say very little about marine
transportation generally, and maritime safety and vessel-source pollution in
particular. This is partly explained by the difficulties faced by the Department
of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) in performing its “integration” mandate as lead
department under the Oceans Act,15 and partly due to a fundamental difference
in marine culture between departments dedicated to oceans and fisheries on the
one hand and maritime transport on the other.16 Although in public the federal
institutional family tends to espouse interdepartmental cooperation, in reality
Transport Canada has played a marginal role in DFO’s ocean policy initiatives.
As with all federal departments, Transport Canada has its own national
sectoral policy process, consisting of what may be described as macro and
micro policies. In 2003 Liberal Transport Minister David Collenette announced
12

See generally Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, “TB Management Accountability
Framework,”
available:
<http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/maf-crg/index-eng.asp>
(retrieved
10 November 2008).
13
Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Canada’s Oceans Strategy: Our Oceans, Our Future
(Ottawa: Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Oceans Directorate, 2002), available: <http://www.dfompo.gc.ca/oceans-habitat/oceans/ri-rs/cos-soc/index_e.asp> (retrieved 10 November 2008).
14
Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Canada’s Oceans Action Plan: For Present and Future
Generations (Ottawa: Fisheries and Oceans Canada, 2005), available: <http://www.dfompo.gc.ca/oceans-habitat/oceans/oap-pao/index_e.asp> (retrieved 10 November 2008).
15
Oceans Act, S.C. 1996, c. 31.
16
See A. Chircop, “The Regulation of Marine Transportation and Integrated Coastal
Management: Two Management Approaches in Need of Integration,” in J. Norton Moore, Kuen
Chen Fu and M. Nordquist, eds, Recent Developments in the Law of the Sea and China (Leiden:
Nijhoff, 2005).
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“Straight Ahead - A Vision for Transportation in Canada,” a major macro
policy that contained little new provision for the marine sector, but confirmed
existing port divestiture, review with industry of benefits of marine
transportation, evaluation of the provision of marine navigational services and
continued participation in international shipping policy processes, notably the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and
International Maritime Organization (IMO).17 Also at a macro level, the
Department has its own Sustainable Development Strategy and Action Plan18
outlining the strategic priorities, challenges, commitments, and performance
measures for measuring success. The Department’s Sustainable Development
Strategy (SDS) focuses on three areas (urban transportation, commercial freight
transportation, and marine transportation) where the Department feels it can
make a difference towards achieving sustainable development. In connection
with marine transportation, the SDS states that the Department will address
pollution from ship emissions (both atmospheric and marine) and from the
presence of the ship itself, and identifies some of the major initiatives
undertaken by the Department in that regard.19 However, it does not provide
insight into how decisions regarding those initiatives are made. In addition to
the macro policies, the Department has formulated problem-specific
management responses that are in effect also policy decisions. These include
the strategies for invasive alien species,20 places of refuge,21 Canada Shipping
Act, 2001 compliance and enforcement, and safety and security culture.22
17

Transport Canada, Straight Ahead – A Vision for Transportation in Canada, TP 14054,
online: <http://www.tc.gc.ca/publications/straightahead/vision/menu.htm> [hereinafter Transport Canada, Straight Ahead].
18
Transport Canada, Sustainable Development Strategy 2007–2009, TP 13123 (Transport
Canada, 2006), available: <http://www.tc.gc.ca/pol/en/acs/SD/sds0709/menu.htm> (retrieved
10 November 2008).
19
Major initiatives include: Business case for environmental incentive programme in the
marine sector, shortsea shipping, skills and labour, transportation data and information and
marine pollution control initiatives (sulphur emission control areas, ballast water management,
HNS response, ship waste management/reception and aerial surveillance).
20
Environment Canada, An Invasive Alien Species Strategy for Canada (Environment Canada,
2004), available: <www.ec.gc.ca/eee-ias> (retrieved 10 November 2008). Fisheries and Oceans
Canada, Canadian Action Plan to Address the Threat of Aquatic Invasive Species (Canadian
Council of Fisheries and Aquaculture Ministers: 2004), available: <www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/
science/environmental-environnement/invasive_e.htm> (retrieved 10 November 2008).
21
Transport Canada, National Places of Refuge Contingency Plan, TP 14707 (Transport
Canada, 2007), available: <http://www.tc.gc.ca/MarineSafety/tp/tp14707/menu.htm> (retrieved
10 November 2008).
22
Transport Canada, Moving Forward: Changing the Safety and Security Culture, TP 14678
(Transport Canada, 2008), available: <http://www.tc.gc.ca/tcss/StrategicPlan/menu.html>
(retrieved 10 November 2008).
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Transport Canada’s policy framework for the transportation industry in
general is found in “Straight Ahead – A Vision for Transportation in Canada.”
The document covers all modes of transportation, offering a framework to
guide future transportation policy development and initiatives. In general, it
emphasises a market-based approach to policy decisions in order to achieve
“a better matching of investment decisions in infrastructure to user needs and
offers.”23 In the context of marine safety and the environment, the document
specifically supports the implementation of strategic plans formulated by
Marine Safety, an important unit within Transport Canada.
Marine Safety has produced two strategic plans (1997–2002; 2003–
24
2010) and is working on a third (2008–2015).25 The first plan, “The Way
Ahead,” reflected the Department’s recent reorganisation and new oversight
role. It focused on strategies that impacted Marine Safety’s internal
environment and called for the modernisation and streamlining of the existing
legislative regime (including the Canada Shipping Act and the Pilotage Act) to
better reflect modern shipping practices. It also highlighted the need to maintain
safety standards through more cost-effective means, i.e., the delegation of
statutory inspection functions to classification societies and to formalise the
consultation process and communication links within Transport Canada and
between the Department and stakeholders. This entailed a renewal of the
Canadian Marine Advisory Council, which is a key forum through which the
various departmental units interact with stakeholders at the national level.
The second plan, “The Next Wave,” continues the strategic direction set out in
the previous plan and follows up on the implementation of the Canada
Shipping Act, 2001, which had been adopted recently. The plan called for the
development and enhancement of a comprehensive performance-based
regulatory framework to enable the bringing into force of the Act. It also
emphasised the need for a risk-based inspection regime, enhanced pollution
prevention, development of a quality assurance programme and safety
management systems, and promotion of a stronger safety culture within the
marine industry. The plan also committed to the ongoing development of
information systems to ensure data collection systems provide the best possible
information for safety planning and decision making. At the time of writing,
23

Transport Canada, Straight Ahead, n. 17 above, p. 84.
Transport Canada, Marine Safety Strategic Plan 1997–2002 (The Way Ahead), TP 13111,
available:
<http://www.tc.gc.ca/marinesafety/TP/TP13111/strategic-plan-1997-2002/
menu.htm> (retrieved 10 November 2008); and Transport Canada, The Next Wave: Marine
Safety Strategic Plan 2003–2010, TP13111B (2003), available: <http://www.tc.gc.ca/
marinesafety/TP/TP13111/strategic-plan-2003-2010/menu.htm> (retrieved 10 November 2008).
25
Transport Canada, The New Wave: Marine Safety Strategic Plan 2008–2015 (draft, 2008)
[hereinafter Transport Canada, The New Wave].
24
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Marine Safety is developing a third strategic plan, “The New Wave,” that will
reflect the organisation’s increasing focus on small commercial vessels and
tougher global pollution prevention regulations. It also recognises the growth
and importance of the maritime labour market factors. The Plan further calls for
strengthened risk-based decision making and the implementation of
an integrated management system within Marine Safety. It also includes
improvement of the regulatory framework by strengthening the consultation
process, continuing a performance-based regulatory scheme, developing and
implementing safety management systems for domestic shipping, and faster
ratification of international instruments.
Despite the various policy layers identified above, Canada does not have
a dedicated and fully integrated marine transportation policy that includes
directions for marine safety and vessel-source pollution. The National Marine
Policy adopted in 199526 was not such a document as it focused, for the most
part, on overhauling Canada’s overbuilt public infrastructure and its
management on the basis of the principle of commercialisation. Consequently,
the latter policy focused primarily on the re-organisation of the country’s port
system and related legislation and led to the adoption of the Canada Marine
Act.27 Although given general directions from higher policies, Canadian policy
for maritime safety regulation and vessel-source pollution is fundamentally set
at a departmental level, and more specifically at the unit level, i.e., Marine
Safety, and formulated as strategic plans. Despite the series of strategy
documents, there does not appear to be a straightforward policy plan, with clear
and concise goals for marine safety and environmental regulation. On the
environmental side the focus is on “sustainability”; on the safety side, the main
focus is on safety management systems and accident prevention. Overall, the
Canadian maritime regulatory framework is now less prescriptive and more
focused on performance and risk management. Transport Canada’s shift toward
greater focus on safety management reflects recognition that the regulatory
approach does not ensure adequate risk management and adds a burden on the
Department’s limited resources (e.g., enforcement).28

26

Transport Canada, National Marine Policy (Ottawa: Transport Canada, 1995).
Canada Marine Act, S.C. 1998, c. 10.
28
Moving Forward, TC’s safety management strategy, starts with the recognition that “an entity
can comply with regulations without effectively managing risks to acceptable levels. A more
comprehensive approach, which includes systematically understanding and managing risks and
threats in the system, will enable us to make progress on our safety and security objectives.”
Transport Canada, Moving Forward, n. 22 above, p. iii.
27
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17.4. Evolution of the Maritime Legislative Framework and Canadian
Ratification Pattern of IMO Conventions
The contemporary sources of maritime law in Canada consist of federal
statutes, case law and maritime law conventions to which Canada is a party.
Canadian maritime law is federal law. Canada inherited the original structure of
its maritime and admiralty law from English law.29 Much of Canada’s early
maritime law consisted of 19th century English statutory law and case law,
which was applied in the colonies, and generally received into Canadian law on
confederation in 1867. Canada did not enjoy legislative powers over foreign
affairs until the Statute of Westminster in 193130 and consequently the Canadian
Parliament was limited in its ability to regulate shipping. With Westminster,
Canada attained competence to deal with admiralty and shipping matters and in
1934 enacted the Admiralty Act, 193431 and the first Canada Shipping Act.32
British dominance of Canadian maritime legislation would continue well after
this period.33 However, from 1931 onwards, Canada was in a position to further
develop its policy and legislative framework for maritime matters generally
through numerous amendments to the Canada Shipping Act and its eventual
transformation into the Canada Shipping Act, 2001,34 the Marine Liability Act35
and numerous other statutes listed in Table 17.1. Empowered by the Federal
Court Act, which was adopted in 1971,36 Canadian courts would also embark
on a case law development path that would part ways in many respects with
English maritime law.

29

For a historical account of the historical origins of Canadian maritime law and jurisdiction,
see generally Gold et al., n. 7 above at 114–110.
30
Statute of Westminster, 22 Geo. V., c. 4.
31
Admiralty Act, S.C. 1934, c. 31.
32
Canada Shipping Act, S.C. 1934, c. 44.
33
See T. L. McDorman, “The History of Shipping Law in Canada: The British Dominance,”
Dalhousie Law Journal 7 (1982–1983): 620.
34
Canada Shipping Act, S.C. 2001, c. 26 [hereinafter CSA 2001].
35
Marine Liability Act, S.C. 2001, c. 6.
36
Federal Court Act, S.C. 1971, c. 1. The title of the Act would later be amended to Federal
Courts Act. The Federal Court, as the Admiralty Court of Canada, succeeded the Exchequer
Court.
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Table 17.1. Statutory scheme for maritime and related statutes in Canada
Legislation
Constitutional
Judicature
Maritime

Fisheries &
Environmental

Oil & Gas

Other

Statutes
Constitution Act
Federal Courts Act
Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act
Bills of Lading Act
Canada Marine Act
Canada Shipping Act
Canada Transportation Act
Coasting Trade Act
Marine Insurance Act
Marine Liability Act
Marine Transportation Security Act
Merchant Seamen Compensation Act
Navigable Waters Protection Act
Pilotage Act
Safe Containers Convention Act
Canada National Marine Conservation Areas
Act
Canada Water Act
Canada Wildlife Act
Canadian Environmental Assessment Act
Canadian Environmental Protection Act
Fisheries Act
Migratory Birds Convention Act, 1994
Canada Oil and Gas Operations Act
Canada-Newfoundland Atlantic Accord
Implementation Act
Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum
Resources Accord Implementation Act
Atomic Energy Control Act
Bank Act
Canada Labour Code
Canadian Transportation Accident
Investigation and Safety Board Act
Nuclear Liability Act
Oceans Act
Transportation of Dangerous Goods Act, 1992

The development of Canadian maritime law as it relates to safety,
environmental and security considerations has in great part reflected
commitments to international maritime conventions and generally the work of
the IMO in developing these instruments, as well as the incremental
development of technical standards and guidelines. The Canada Shipping Act,
2001 includes as an objective to “ensure that Canada can meet its international
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obligations under bilateral and multilateral agreements with respect to
navigation and shipping.”37 The Act implements numerous international
maritime conventions to which Canada is a party.38 Section 32(1) of the Act
provides for referential incorporation of standards produced by international
bodies through regulatory action. The Marine Liability Act essentially consists
of principles and rules set out in international conventions to which Canada is
or may become a party.
Canada is not a party to all the IMO Conventions. On safety matters,
Canada is a party to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea,
1974 as amended (SOLAS),39 International Convention on Load Lines,40
Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea,
197241 and International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, 1979,42
but not to the 1978 and 1988 protocols of SOLAS.43 On vessel-source
pollution, Canada is a party to International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution from Ships, 1973 as amended by the Protocol of 1978 (MARPOL)
and Annexes I to III, but not to Annexes IV to VI.44 It is a party to the
International Convention on Salvage, 198945 and International Convention on
Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation, 1990 (OPRC), but not
to the OPRC Protocol on Hazardous and Noxious Substances.46 Canada is not
37

CSA 2001, n. 34 above, s. 6(g).
Id. (Schedule 1 lists 31 conventions as the responsibility of the Minister of Transport and
Schedule 2 states two others under the responsibility of the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans).
39
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, 1 November 1974, 1184
U.N.T.S. 2, Institute of Maritime Law, The Ratification of Maritime Conventions (London:
Lloyd’s Press, 1991–2003), Vol. I.3.20.
40
International Convention on Load Lines, 1966, 5 April 1966, 640 U.N.T.S. 133, Institute of
Maritime Law, The Ratification of Maritime Conventions (London: Lloyd’s Press, 1991–2003)
Vol. I.3.50; Protocol of 1988 relating to the International Convention on Load Lines, 1966, 11
November 1988, 2 U.S.T. 102, Institute of Maritime Law, n. 39 above, Vol. I.3.60.
41
Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972, 20
October 1972, 1050 U.N.T.S. 16, Institute of Maritime Law, n. 39, Vol. I.3.250.
42
International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, 27 April 1979, 1405 U.N.T.S. 97,
Institute of Maritime Law, n. 39 above, Vol. I.3.280.
43
Protocol relating to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, 17
February 1978, 1276 U.N.T.S. 237, Institute of Maritime Law, n. 39 above, Vol. I.3.30;
Protocol of 1988 relating to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, 11
November 1988, U.S. Treaty Doc. 102-2, Institute of Maritime Law, n. 39 above, Vol. I.3.40.
44
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 2 November 1973, 1340
U.N.T.S. 184; Protocol of 1978 relating to the International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution from Ships of 1973, 17 February 1978, 1340 U.N.T.S. 61.
45
International Convention on Salvage, 28 April 1989, U.K.T.S. 1996 No. 93.
46
International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation,
30 November 1990, 30 I.L.M. 733; OPRC/HNS Protocol, Protocol on Preparedness, Response
38
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a party to the International Convention on the Control of Harmful Anti-Fouling
Systems on Ships, 2001,47 International Convention for the Control and
Management of Ships’ Ballast Water and Sediments, 200448 and the recently
adopted International Convention on the Removal of Wrecks, 2007,49 but has
legislated rules and standards for ballast waters, anti-fouling systems and
wrecks in navigable waterways.50 On damage liability and compensation,
Canada is a party to the Protocol to Amend the International Convention on
Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 1969, 1992 (CLC)51 and Protocol to
amend the International Convention on the Establishment of an International
Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1971, 1992 (IOPCF),52 but
not to the Protocol of 2003.53 Recently Canada became a party to the
Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims, 1976 (LLMC), as
amended by the Protocol of 1996.54 Canada has not always become a party to
international conventions that it has in fact implemented. For example,
provisions of MARPOL and the LLMC were implemented in Canadian
legislation long before Canada became a party to those instruments.
There have been some departures from IMO international standards at
various points in time. Canada did not become a party to MARPOL when this
instrument came into force partly because it believed it had higher pollution
and Co-operation to Pollution Incidents by Hazardous and Noxious Substances, 2000, IMO
Doc. HNSOPRC/CONF/11/Rev 1, 15 March 2000.
47
International Convention on the Control of Harmful Anti-Fouling Systems on Ships, London,
5 October 2001 (London: IMO, 2005) [hereinafter AFS Convention].
48
International Convention for the Control and Management of Ships’ Ballast Water and
Sediments, London, 16 February 2004, IMO Doc. IMO/BWM/CONF/36.
49
International Convention on the Removal of Wrecks, Nairobi, 18 May 2007, IMO Doc. No.
LEG/CONF.16/21.
50
Navigable Waters Protection Act (R.S.C., 1985, c. N-22); Ballast Water Control and
Management Regulations (SOR/2006-129); and Regulations for the Prevention of Pollution
from Ships and for Dangerous Chemicals (SOR/2007-86).
51
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 29 November 1969,
973 U.N.T.S. 3, as amended by Protocol to Amend the International Convention on Civil
Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 1969, 27 November 1992, U.K.T.S. 1996 No. 87
[hereinafter CLC].
52
International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation
for Oil Pollution Damage, 18 December 1971, 1110 U.N.T.S. 57, as amended by Protocol to
amend the International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1971, 27 November 1992, 1996 A.T.S. 3.
53
Protocol of 2003 to the International Convention on the Establishment of an International
Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1992, 16 May 2003, IMO Doc. No.
LEG/CONF.14/20.
54
Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims, 1976, 19 November 1976, 1456
U.N.T.S. 221, as amended by the Protocol of 1996 to amend the Convention on Limitation of
Liability for Maritime Claims, 1976, 2 May 1996, 35 I.L.M. 1433.
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standards in its legislation. In relation to Arctic waters, Canada made
a reservation to its ratification to MARPOL to safeguard the application of the
Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act55 in the Canadian Arctic.56 This latter
statute sets higher waste management and discharge standards in Arctic waters
from ships for most ship-generated waste and anticipated the special power
conferred on coastal states for ice-covered areas by Article 234 of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982,57 to which Canada is a party.
17.5. Institutional Framework and New Directions for the Maritime
Administration
In principle and at law, Transport Canada is the maritime administration of
Canada. In practice, functions related to maritime administration are shared
among a number of federal government departments, forming a complex
institutional mosaic.58
A year after the adoption of the original Canada Shipping Act, Transport
Canada’s first iteration was established in 1935 in response to the new
challenges facing the organisation of national transportation.59 At this time,
institutions responsible for Canadian railways, inland navigation and marine
shipping were integrated and the Department of Transport Act, 1936 was
adopted.60 Until 1994 Transport Canada performed a dual role that involved the
“administration” and “management” of the transport system as well as
developing the policy and regulatory framework. This was perceived to result
55

Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. A-12 [hereinafter AWPPA].
International Maritime Organization (IMO), Status of Multilateral Conventions and
Instruments in Respect of which the International Maritime Organization or its secretaryGeneral Performs Depositary or other Functions, as at 31 December 2005, IMO Doc. J/9193,
p. 96 [hereinafter IMO].
57
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Montego Bay, 10 December 1982, UN
Doc. A/CONF.62/122, 7 October 1982, 33 I.L.M. 1309.
58
There are, in addition: (1) consultative bodies, such as the Canadian Marine Advisory
Council and National Marine and Industrial Council; and (2) technical or function-specific
bodies, including those established by statute, such as the Canada Transportation Agency,
Marine Technical Review Board, Transportation Appeal Tribunal of Canada, Transportation
Safety Board, and Ship Source Pollution Fund. Further, industry and transportation professional
groups (e.g., Canadian Maritime Law Association, Shipping Federation of Canada, and
Canadian Shipowners Association, among several others) are active participants in maritime
policy and law-making processes.
59
Transport Canada, Transport Canada: Our Story [1936–1946] (n.d.), available:
<http://www.tc.gc.ca/publications/ourstory/1936-1946-menu.htm> (retrieved 10 November
2008).
60
Today this statute is the Department of Transport Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. T-18.
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in a conflict of interest and it was decided that Transport Canada should focus
primarily on policy and regulatory responsibilities. Thus, in 1994 Transport
Canada was reorganised, the St. Lawrence Seaway and numerous ports were
also transferred from Transport Canada to local authorities. Transport Canada
also lost the Canadian Coast Guard to DFO, ostensibly in order to rationalise
government and reduce costs through the merger of the two departments’
fleets.61 As a result, and at least until 2003, Transport Canada became less of
an organisation focused on “administration” and “management” of operations,
and became more focused on policy and regulatory functions. In late 2003, all
marine safety policy and regulatory responsibilities were consolidated under
this department. As a result, the Office of Boating Safety, the Navigable Waters
Protection Act,62 and certain regulatory aspects of pollution prevention and
emergency response, formerly responsibilities of other departments, were
transferred back to Transport Canada.63 At this time, the Canadian Coast Guard
remains attached to DFO, although as a special operating agency. Today
Transport Canada is responsible for developing national transportation policies
and programmes. Within Transport Canada, Marine Safety is the principal
policy, regulatory and enforcement agency relating to ship safety and marine
pollution prevention. Transport Canada is the lead agency under the Canada
Shipping Act, 2001, the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, the Navigable
Waters Protection Act, and the Canada Marine Act.
DFO is tasked by legislation to lead and develop Canada’s national
oceans strategy and integrated management planning for the marine
environment. This department focuses on Canada’s economic, ecological, and
scientific interests in oceans, including fisheries, hydrography, and marine
services, and the coordination of federal policies and programmes respecting
oceans.64 It shares jurisdiction with Transport Canada in many areas and is
responsible for the administration and implementation of the Oceans Act and
Fisheries Act.65 In particular, it is responsible under the Canada Shipping Act,
2001 for dealing with pollution response.66 Operating under the DFO umbrella,
the Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) is the civilian federal agency responsible for
patrolling Canada’s coastline, providing marine search and rescue, maintenance
of aids to navigation, marine pollution response, and icebreaking services. The
move to DFO led to low morale and caused operational difficulties possibly
61

Transport Canada, Transport Canada: Our Story [1986–1996] (n.d.), available:
<http://www.tc.gc.ca/publications/ourstory/1986-1996-2.htm> (retrieved 10 November 2008).
62
Navigable Waters Protection Act, n. 50 above.
63
Transport Canada, The New Wave, n. 25 above, p. 4.
64
Department of Fisheries and Oceans Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. F-15, s. 4.
65
Fisheries Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. F-14 [hereinafter FA].
66
CSA 2001, n. 34 above at ss. 174.1, 179 & 180.
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resulting from differences between its shipping culture and the fisheries
development and management culture of its new home, as well as budget cuts
in the name of rationalisation.67
The Department of Environment (Environment Canada)68 is responsible
for the administration of several statutes for the protection and conservation of
Canada’s environment. Environment Canada has direct responsibility for
marine pollution under the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999,69
Canada Water Act,70 Canada Wildlife Act,71 the Migratory Birds Convention
Act, 199472 and the pollution prevention provisions of the Fisheries Act.73
Environment Canada is the lead federal department on response and cleanup of
up of hazardous wastes and oil spills. It operates in conjunction with DFO and
Transport Canada in relation to several of its marine tasks.
Given the complexity and overlap of legislative and enforcement
authority within the federal government, it is not surprising that a great deal of
coordination is required between the various agencies involved. For example,
vessel-source marine pollution is enforced by Transport Canada Inspectors
(CSA 2001), Fisheries Officers (FA), Environment Canada’s Enforcement
Branch (CEPA), and the Canadian Wildlife Service’s Enforcement Branch
(MBCA). Although some interdepartmental dialogue occurs at the legislative
steering committee level, there appears to have been little effective dialogue
and cooperation in the development of regulatory strategies and policy. Faced
with overlapping and competing mandates, Transport Canada, DFO, and
Environment Canada have concluded memoranda of agreement to cooperate on
enforcement issues.74
67

See the testimony of Michael Turner, former Deputy Commissioner and Acting
Commissioner of the Canadian Coast Guard in Standing Senate Committee on Fisheries and
Oceans, “The Coast Guard in Canada’s Arctic: Interim Report,” Fourth Report, June 2008,
p. 36.
68
Department of the Environment Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. E-10.
69
Canadian Environmental Protection Act, S.C. 1999, c. 33 [hereinafter CEPA].
70
Canada Water Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-11.
71
Canada Wildlife Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. W-9.
72
Migratory Birds Convention Act, S.C., 1994, c. 22 [hereinafter MBCA].
73
Under an administrative agreement with DFO, EC has primary responsibility for the pollution
prevention provisions of the Fisheries Act. Environment Canada, Compliance and Enforcement
Report - Volume 1, available: <http://environnementcanada.gc.ca/alef-ewe/default.asp?lang=
en&n=09ECE703> (retrieved 10 November 2008), Section 1.
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Some of the main MOUs signed to date are: TC/EC MOU respecting Enforcement (of the
CSA 2001, AWPPA, MBCA and CEPA) (2006); TC/DFO MOU respecting Safety at Sea of
Commercial Fishers (November 2006); TC/EC/DFO MOU respecting Enforcement in Atlantic
Canada (2002); TC/DFO MOU and Resource Transfer Agreement (regarding transfer of the
CCG policy responsibilities to TC) (3 March 2005); TC/DFO MOU respecting Marine
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17.6. Selected Thematic Issues

17.6.1. Maritime Safety
Canada’s principal legislation concerning maritime safety is the Canada
Shipping Act, 2001, which came into force on 1 July 2007. As mentioned
earlier, the original Canada Shipping Act dated back to 1934, and since then it
saw numerous amendments and add-ons, making the legislation voluminous
and unwieldy. As McDorman noted, the underlying policy rationale tended to
reflect former British imperial interests rather than the contemporary trading
interests of a modern nation such as Canada.75 The legislation was also
notoriously complex and inefficient, with over one hundred sets of regulations,
making it difficult to enforce. Perhaps a major problem with the old legislation
was its emphasis on regulation that required enforcement. For these and other
reasons, a process of legal reform was commenced in 1997 and culminated in
the adoption of the modern and streamlined Canada Shipping Act, 2001.
The change has been described as a move from an inspection-based to
a compliance-based regime, with a greater emphasis on a proactive approach to
maritime safety and promotion of compliance.76 Since the adoption of the Act
in 2001, regulations under the new act took years to modernise and re-enact
through an ongoing consultative process with industry and other bodies, and the
process continues today. With its many changes, the Act is touted as better
suited to promoting safer, more efficient, and environmentally sound shipping.
In fact, it takes into consideration the broader range of vessels in Canadian
navigable waters (from pleasure boating to commercial vessels) and provides
for modern operational safety and environmental standards.
In the European Union (EU), a similar trend toward performance based
legislation is observed, but Member States insist on following initiatives within
the IMO framework. A point of divergence is in the provision of services,
which in Canada is determined on a mixed risk-based decision making plus
market-based approach (e.g., privatisation, user-pays). In comparison, in the
EU, provision of services is generally governed by the EU rule on free
provision of services (also market-based approach), but with certain exclusions
for public utility services. In addition, there are differences between Member
Transportation Safety & Environmental Protection (April 1996); DFO/EC MOU respecting
administration of the Fisheries Act (1985).
75
McDorman, n. 33 above, p. 651.
76
Transport Canada, “Canada Shipping Act, 2001 ushers in new era of safety and protection of
the marine environment,” News Release, No. H 133/07 (3 July 2007).
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States as this issue belongs to the area of shared (EU-Member State)
competences.

17.6.1.1. Delegation of Functions to Classification Societies and Their
Supervision
A major change introduced by the Canada Shipping Act, 2001 is the delegation
of certain functions previously considered the exclusive reserve of the maritime
administration. The EU also delegates certain tasks to classification societies. In
Canada, the Canada Shipping Act, 2001 empowers the Minister of Transport
with discretionary authority to delegate classification societies to issue
Canadian maritime documents, carry out compliance inspections, and undertake
audit inspections.77 To date, five classification societies have been authorised to
do so.78 The move toward delegated statutory inspection was a specific
commitment made in Marine Safety’s in “The Way Ahead” and was first
implemented in 1998.79 In July 1999, prior to proceeding with the
comprehensive “master” delegation agreements, Transport Canada signed
agreements concerning certification for the International Safety Management
(ISM) Code.80 Ships may enrol in the Delegated Statutory Inspection
77

CSA 2001, n. 34 above, ss. 12 & 13.
Lloyd’s Register of Shipping (4 December 2000), American Bureau of Shipping (23 March
2001), Germanischer Lloyd (10 September 2001), Det Norske Veritas (22 April 2002), and
Bureau Veritas (31 March 2003). Transport Canada, “Delegation of Statutory Inspection and
Certification” website, available: <http://www.tc.gc.ca/marinesafety/NPD/Intro-Text/
menu.htm> (retrieved 10 November 2008) [hereinafter Transport Canada, “DSI&C”].
79
Bill C-15, an Act to amend the Canada Shipping Act and to make consequential amendments
to other Acts (1st Sess., 36th Parl., 46 Eliz. II., 1997), 1998, c. 16, s. 6, adding s. 317.1 to the
Canada Shipping Act, 1985. At the time of passing only one political party, the New
Democratic Party, opposed this move on the grounds that: a) “[p]rivatization of inspection will
… increase bottom line pressures to cut corners to do things the cheap way rather than the safe
way,” b) that the job of safety inspector will become a patronage appointment, c) that
classification societies are often lax, and d) that a large amount of revenue generated through
inspections will be lost to international players. House of Commons Debates, Second Reading
of Bill C-15 (Edited Hansard, Debates No. 77: 19 March, 1998), p. 1105 (Bev Desjarlais),
available: <http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=2332782&
Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=36&Ses=1> (retrieved 10 November 2008) and House of
Commons Debates, Third Reading of Bill C-15 (Edited Hansard, Debates No. 96: 30 April,
1998), p. 1105 (Bev Desjarlais), available: <http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/
Publication.aspx?DocId=2332801&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=36&Ses=1>
(retrieved
10 November 2008).
80
This was done under the Safety Management Regulations with the five delegated
classification societies. Those agreements are now considered complementary to the “master”
agreements. Transport Canada, “DSI&C,” n. 78 above.
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Programme (DSIP)81 and thereafter its classification society becomes the sole
issuing authority for the vessel’s certificates. The DSIP encompasses most of
the surveys and certification required under the Act and regulations, including
documentary requirements of international conventions to which Canada is
a party.82 Although these moves suggest a comprehensive delegation of
authority, in practice Marine Safety has retained sole issuing authority for
several important documents.83 Further, Marine Safety retains authority to
ensure that Canadian vessels comply with all applicable international and
domestic requirements, and may monitor compliance through various
administrative and executive measures.84

17.6.1.2. Phasing-Out of Single-Hull Tankers
The phasing-out of single-hull tankers from trading in Canadian waters has had
to tie in to the requirements of the United States Oil Pollution Act of 199085 and
subsequently the initiative to amend Regulation 13 of Annex I to MARPOL
concerning existing and new tankers. The purpose was to improve the standards
of existing and new tankers as a preventative measure to accidental oil pollution
resulting from an incident, such as collision or grounding, or in a worse case
scenario, a casualty at sea. As noted earlier, the bulk of Canadian trade is with
its southern neighbour and therefore any major change to the conditions or
transportation of that trade can be expected to affect Canada. Accordingly,
Canada proceeded to implement the single-hull standard under the influence of
the United States’ legislation as early as 1993 and further developed in 1995 to
81

Transport Canada, Delegated Statutory Inspection Programme, TP 13585E (Ottawa:
Transport Canada, 17 December 2001), available: <http://www.tc.gc.ca/marinesafety/NPD/
Delegated-Statutory-Inspection/Revision-1-signed.PDF> (retrieved 10 November 2008)
[hereinafter Transport Canada, DSIP].
82
Id., para. 3.2.4.
83
E.g., Marine Occupational Safety and Heath requirements; Safety Convention certificates on
passenger vessels; extending inspection intervals or certificates more than two months beyond
the due date; exemption of certificates; revoking a certificate; any statutory function or
inspection not explicitly transferred. Transport Canada, DISP, n. 79 above, paras. 3–4.
84
E.g., administrative reviews of the delegated organisation’s reports and records; announced
and unannounced verification inspections (of a scope comparable to a port state control
inspection); dry-dock examinations; marine casualties and damage surveys; liaison with the
delegated organisation; and audit of delegated organisation’s shore operations. Id.
85
Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. 2701, et seq. See the US Coast Guard Interim Final Rule
on Double Hull Standards for Vessels Carrying Oil in Bulk, issued 12 August 1992 for smaller
existing tankers.
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apply to both Canadian ships and non-Canadian ships trading in Canadian
waters, including the exclusive economic zone (EEZ).86 Following the loss of
the Erika and subsequently the Prestige off the coasts of France and Spain
respectively, the IMO was urged to accelerate the phasing out of single-hulls
and to bring international standards more in line with the Oil Pollution Act of
1990 through further amendments to MARPOL.87 In addition to an accelerated
phase-out for single-hulls, heavy grade oils (HGOs) were banned from carriage
by single-hulls being phased out and the Condition Assessment Scheme for
these ships was extended.88
Despite what appeared to be a convergence of international standards for
single-hull tankers and the oil trade, which had suffered a seismic split with the
Oil Pollution Act of 1990, there continued to be differences between the
regulations under the Act and the revised MARPOL Annex I regulations. This
was a divergence that Canada obviously could not ignore. Hence, Canadian
regulations on single-hull phase-outs have had to apply two parallel regimes.
The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 requirements continue to be applied to certain
existing tankers, notably those trading with the United States,89 whereas others
are to be governed by the amended MARPOL Annex I standards.90 In contrast,
the EU has a single regime governed by the amended MARPOL to accelerate
the phase-out, which was largely at the behest of the EU.
86

Oil Pollution Prevention Regulations, SOR/03-3, at s. 14.2: “Any oil tanker that is engaged in
voyages that take place in waters under Canadian jurisdiction shall comply with Standards for
the Double Hull Construction of Oil Tankers, TP 11710, published by the Canadian Coast
Guard on July 6, 1993, as amended from time to time, other than sections 3 and 5 and
subparagraphs 24(a)(i), (b)(i) and (c)(i) of those Standards.” Superseded by Regulations for the
Prevention of Pollution from Ships and for Dangerous Chemicals, SOR/2007-86, s. 54 et. seq.
87
Specifically Regulations 13F, 13G and 13H to Annex I for new tankers and existing large
tankers. Following Erika, amendments to Regulation 13G resolution MEPC.95(46) included
smaller tankers and brought MARPOL closer in line with the US OPA 1990 in order to bring
the international requirements more in line with OPA 90 requirements by 2015. However, with
Prestige in 2002, Regulation 13G was amended further and a new Regulation 13H was
introduced accelerating the phase-out, among other.
88
IMO, Resolutions MEPC.111(50) and MEPC.112(50).
89
In particular the following: “Canadian tankers on domestic trade or only trading to the U.S.;
U.S. tankers trading only to Canada or in transit through waters under Canadian jurisdiction;
Canadian tankers that are less than 5000 DWT, except tankers over 600 DWT on international
trade carrying heavy grade oil as cargo; non-Canadian tankers on the coasting trade; nonCanadian tankers on international trade calling at Canadian ports that are less than 5000 DWT,
except tankers over 600 DWT carrying heavy grade oil as cargo.” Transport Canada, Standards
for the Double Hull Construction of Oil Tankers, TP 11710 (Ottawa: Transport Canada, 6 July
1993, rev. 5 April 2005).
90
Id., namely: “Canadian tankers over 5000 DWT requiring international certification; nonCanadian tankers over 5000 DWT on international trade in waters under Canadian jurisdiction;
tankers over 600 DWT on international trade carrying heavy grade oil as cargo.”

548

17.6.1.3. Use of Safety Regulatory Tools for Marine Environmental Protection
and Conservation Purposes
Canada has used regulatory tools normally reserved for the regulation and
management of navigation safety for the purpose of achieving marine
environmental protection and conservation objectives. This type of regulation
relates to restrictions and controls on the movement of vessels, or the conditions
of that movement, and may be of a mandatory or recommendatory nature. This
is a function that rests in DFO and is carried out by the Canadian Coast
Guard.91 The utilisation of these tools for protection and conservation purposes
has provided Canada with the management and enforcement tools needed
without necessarily resorting to the designation of a particularly sensitive sea
area (PSSA) through the IMO, as has been the case in several other regions,
including the marine areas of EU Member States in the Baltic Sea, Canary
Islands region, North Sea (Wadden Sea), and Western European Waters. To
date, there has been only one instance of a PSSA being mooted within the
Canadian federal government, specifically in connection with oil pollution
incidents and consequent bird mortality in the northwest Atlantic off
Newfoundland.92 As it turned out, rather than proceeding the PSSA path, the
federal government passed amendments to the Migratory Birds Convention Act
and Canada Shipping Act, 2001, which toughened the sanctions for oil
pollution offences. In general, there are a number of instances where safety
regulation has been employed for marine environmental protection and
conservation purposes, and in particular in two types of situations.
91

Under the former Canada Shipping Act, s. 125. In 1996 pursuant to the Public Service
Rearrangement and Transfer of Duties Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-34, responsibility for vessel
traffic and marine navigation services under s. 562.15-562.20 and 517-525 of the CSA 1985
was transferred to DFO. TC/DFO, MOU respecting Marine Safety & Environmental Protection
(April 1996), n. 74 above, s. 2, available: <http://www.tc.gc.ca/MarineSafety/TP/mou/
menu.htm> (retrieved 10 November 2008).
92
Although not PSSAs, it should be noted that DFO has designated seven “Marine Protected
Areas” (MPAs) under the Oceans Act, five in Eastern Canada: The Musquash Estuary (7 March
2007), Basin Head (PEI) (11 October 2005), Gilbert Bay (11 October 2005), Eastport
(11 October 2005), The Gully (14 May 2004); and two off the Pacific coast: Bowie Seamount
(21 April 2008), Endeavour Hydrothermal Vents (7 March 2003). Fisheries and Oceans
Canada, “Marine Protected Areas,” available: <http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/oceans/marineareaszonesmarines/mpa-zpm/index-eng.htm> (retrieved 10 November 2008). The system of MPAs is
also complemented by “Marine Wildlife Areas” established by Environment Canada and
“National Marine Conservation Areas” established by Parks Canada. Again, there are no PSSAs
established with regard to any of these. The departments and agencies are coordinated by the
Federal Marine Protected Areas Strategy (Ottawa: DFO, 2005), available: <http://www.dfompo.gc.ca/oceans-habitat/oceans/mpa-zpm/fedmpa-zpmfed/index_e.asp> (retrieved 10 November 2008).
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The first concerns the requirement of use of automatic identification
system (AIS), now an IMO international standard and which, while enabling
the identification of the location of a vessel for the purposes of traffic regulation
and search and rescue, also assists aerial surveillance of potential polluters and
evidence for prosecutions.93 Information concerning the identity and course of
the ship is relayed to coastal authorities on a real-time basis and has enabled
more efficient use of limited surveillance resources. The reporting of a slick
may thus be traced to a vessel that may have been navigating the area. In
another application, a fishing vessel that appears to be undertaking irregular
movement at a slow speed in a marine protected area may also suggest that
illegal fishing may be taking place.
The second situation concerns the conservation needs of a particular
species and protection of its habitat, possibly on a seasonal basis. In the Atlantic
region this has occurred in the form of change to the shipping lanes in the
Canadian sector of the Bay of Fundy to protect the North Atlantic Right Whale
population from ship strikes, a major cause of premature mortality for this
endangered species. Studies of sightings between 1987–2000 suggested that the
shipping lanes in the Bay of Fundy were in direct conflict with areas where
major aggregations of this species occurred, and that a slight adjustment to the
location of the lanes in the traffic separation scheme in the area could
significantly reduce the ship strikes.94 A proposal was made to the IMO and
after consideration by the Sub-Committee on Safety of Navigation (NAV),
the proposed changes were adopted. The changes were made as part of the
North Atlantic Right Whale Recovery Plan led by DFO95 after a joint
government-industry working group concluded that the most cost effective way
of reducing strikes (by as much as 80 percent) while maintaining safe
commercial navigation was to shift ship traffic flow in areas of highest whale
density.96 The success of this initiative led to a similar proposal for the
93

Pursuant to the Navigation Safety Regulations, all vessels over 300 tons on international
voyages and domestic trade ships of 500 GT or more except fishing vessels must carry AIS.
Navigations Safety Regulations, SOR/2005-134, s. 65 (entered into force 10 May 2005). In the
EU, reporting is regulated by Directive 2002/59/EC on Community Vessel Traffic Monitoring
and Information System.
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IMO, Doc. NAV 48/3/5 (5 April 2002).
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Transport Canada, “Bay of Fundy Shipping Lanes Moved to Protect Right Whale,” News
Release, No. A017/02 (19 December 2002), available: <http://www.tc.gc.ca/mediaroom/
releases/atl/2002/02_A017e.htm> (retrieved 10 November 2008). The new lanes were approved
by IMO in December 2002 and became effective 1 July 2003.
96
Transport Canada, “New Bay of Fundy Shipping Lanes to Protect Right Whale come into
effect,” News Release, No. A007/03 (26 June 2003), available: <http://www.tc.gc.ca/
mediaroom/releases/atl/2003/03-A007e.htm> (retrieved 10 November 2008). See also
Guidelines for Vessel Traffic Services, IMO Assembly Res. A.857(20) (27 November 1997);
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Roseway Basin. Again with the conservation needs of the North Atlantic Right
Whale in mind, in 2007 Canada proposed to the IMO that the Roseway Basin,
located off southeastern Nova Scotia, be designated as a seasonal area to be
avoided (ATBA).97 The proposal was adopted by the IMO’s MSC in October
2007 for ships 300 GT or more and takes effect from June 1st to December 31st
each year.98
On a related point, Canada has often used the powers under the Navigable
Waters Protection Act to have sunken vessels and wrecks removed where they
pose hazards to navigation or even constitute a threat to the marine
environment. Although Canada is not yet a party to the recently adopted
Nairobi International Convention on the Removal of Wrecks, 2007, it has been
urged to do so to enable Transport Canada to undertake the removal of derelict
vessels.99 Transport Canada proposes to amend the Act to implement the
operational elements of the Convention.

17.6.2. Vessel-Source Pollution
17.6.2.1. Regime for Pollution Offences
Canada’s approach to the regulation of marine pollution has been aptly
summarised as follows: “Canada has created its marine environmental
legislation through a series of uncoordinated statutes, each attempting to put an
end to intentional marine pollution. Overlapping offences is unnecessary and
useless.”100 This is indeed the situation in Canada—an extensive system of
and generally, Ships’ Routeing, 9th ed. (London: IMO, 2008), IX/2. On the US side, see the
Reporting Systems for Protection of Endangered North Atlantic Right Whales in Sea Areas off
the North-Eastern and South-Eastern Coasts of the United States. Id., G/I/18-1-3.
97
Transport Canada, “Canada’s New Government is Vigilant in the Protection of Endangered
North Atlantic Right Whales,” News Release, No. A 008/07 (10 October 2007), available:
<http://www.tc.gc.ca/mediaroom/releases/atl/2007/07-a008e.htm> (retrieved 10 November
2008). IMO Ships’ Routeing, n. 96 above, II/1.
98
Id. See also IMO, Guidelines for Vessel Traffic Services, n. 96 above.
99
House of Commons, Consideration of Proposed Amendments to the Navigable Waters
Protection Act, Report of the Standing Committee on Transport, Infrastructure and
Communities (June 2008), available: <http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.
aspx?DocId=3566517&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=39&Ses=2> (retrieved 10 November
2008).
100
J. O’Connor, “The Enforcement of Marine Pollution Legislation in Canada” (Paper
presented to the New Direction in Maritime Law 2006 Conference, 16 June 2006)
(unpublished).
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statutes that establish overlapping sanctions legitimated by several statutes and
for what amounts to the same offence (see Annex below). Moreover, there has
been a consequent and not unexpected overlap, if not duplication, of
institutional responsibilities among the various federal departments concerned.
The EU, unlike Canada, has a single Ship Source Pollution Directive
(2005/35/EC) to be implemented by all Member States. Nevertheless, there are
similar underlying concerns in both systems regarding the criminalisation of
seafarers and corporate and vicarious liability.
Canada has been regulating vessel-source pollution utilising criminal and
civil law tools ever since its implementation of OILPOL.101 In 1971 and 1984,
comprehensive marine pollution provisions, including higher penalties, were
added to the Canada Shipping Act.102 The Canada Shipping Act, 2001 is the
principal statute now implementing international conventions addressing
vessel-source pollution to which Canada is a party, such as MARPOL 73/78,103
whereas civil liability and compensation are addressed by the Marine Liability
Act, which is discussed below. The Canada Shipping Act, 2001 provides for
summary conviction procedures with substantial penalties for the most serious
contraventions, such as illegal discharge of pollutant, failure to have or to
implement oil pollution prevention or emergency plans, or failure to obey
instructions resulting from a discharge. Less serious offences, such as failure to
have response, emergency or prevention plans on site or failure to provide
101

The Canada Shipping Act was amended in 1956 to give effect to the OILPOL Convention. 4
& 5 Eliz. II, c. 34 (Can). The Minister of Transport was authorised to draft regulations giving
effect to the Convention and to “prevent pollution by oil from ships of any mainland, minor or
other waters of Canada.” Such regulations were adopted in 1960: Oil Pollution Prevention
Regulations, SOR 60-70, adopted 24 February 1960. Offenders were punished with a fine of up
to CAD500 or imprisonment up to 6 months, or both. CSA 1956, s. 495A.
102
House of Commons Debates 1970, Vol. I, at 519 (Donald Jamieson (Minister of Transport)).
Among the various amendments, the fines for illegal discharge and failure to report a discharge
were increased to CAD100,000 to make crews and masters “more conscious of their
responsibilities” to the environment. Prior to that, the maximum fines that could be imposed on
the master, owner or person responsible for the unlawful spillage of oil from a vessel was
CAD5,000 (Source: Oil Pollution Prevention Regulations, s. 5; Garbage Pollution Prevention
Regulations, s. 4; Pollutant Substances Regulations, s.4). Imprisonment penalties were removed
from the section without any apparent explanation. The fines were increased again in 1984 to
CAD200,000 and to CAD250,000. Bill C-75, an Act to Amend the Canada Shipping Act and
the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act. House of Commons Debates 1983–84, pp. 14263-5.
103
Regulations for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships and for Dangerous Chemicals
(SOR/2007-86), implementing MARPOL Annex I, II, IV, V and VI, the Code for the
Construction and Equipment of Ships Carrying Dangerous Chemicals in Bulk, 1971 (BCH
Code), the International Code for the Construction and Equipment of Ships Carrying
Dangerous Chemicals in Bulk (IBC Code), and the AFS Convention, n. 47 above, in all
Canadian waters although stricter requirements are often required for inland waters.
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information when requested, may result in lower fines.104 These provisions
were greatly influenced by consultations with the shipping industry, so that all
but one of the stated offences were made subject to summary conviction.105
Since 2004, Transport Canada has overall responsibility for enforcement of the
pollution prevention provisions, while DFO is responsible for pollution
response provisions.
Despite the apparent stringent pollution provisions, ongoing illegal
discharges of oily ballast and waste engine room oil in Canada’s EEZ in the
Atlantic resulted in significant seabird mortality. The federal response to this
problem was Bill C-15 amending the Migratory Birds Convention Act and the
Environmental Protection Act. Bill C-15 was enacted to protect migratory birds
and prevent oil pollution discharges from vessels by “expanding the zone where
[Canada] can operate, bringing in tougher penalties and ensuring better
protection for [Canadian] officers in the field.”106 The legislation was triggered
by the perceived failure of the enforcement regime following the Tecum Sea
incident. The Tecum Sea was observed trailing an oil slick, but charges against
the vessel and master were dropped after several legal gaps were identified and
a turf war between the various federal departments with related mandates could
not be resolved.107 During parliamentary deliberations, it was further noted that
it was essential to extend Canadian law to its EEZ and to bring its sanctions in
line with those imposed by courts in the United States because the vast majority
of vessels were simply transiting the Canadian EEZ while trading to or from
that country.108 Because this trade did not include port entry in Canada, there
104

Penalties for serious offences are up to CAD1million in fines or 18 months imprisonment, or
both, other offences are subject to fines of up to CAD100,000 or 1 year imprisonment, or both.
CSA 2001, n. 34 above, ss.183–184, 187–188.
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results in the loss of life or serious damage to the environment, for which the guilty person may
be liable on conviction on indictment to a fine (without maximum limits) or to imprisonment up
to five years, or both. CSA 2001, n. 34 above, s. 253(1).
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Bill C-15 an Act to amend the Migratory Birds Convention Act, 1994, and the Canadian
Environmental Protection Act Discussion (Standing Committee on Environment and
Sustainable Development (ENVI) Evidence, 4 November 2004), available:
<http://cmte.parl.gc.ca/cmte/CommitteePublication.aspx?SourceId=125178#T1020> (retrieved
10 November 2008), per Hon. Stephan Dion (Minister of Environment), p. 1035.
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Id., p. 1040 per Mr. Bryon Wilfert (M.P.) The members also highlighted the need for
an adequate enforcement budget, in particular Mr. Nathan Cullen (M.P.) stated that: “I want to
put the fear of God into some of these captains so that they know there’s a good chance they’re
going to be inspected,” because these enforcement difficulties apparently resulted in a culture
within the shipping community that “if you’re going to spill, you spill in Canada, because (a)
they won’t find you, and (b) if they do find you, they won’t fine you.” Id., p. 1055.
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Id., p. 1055, per Trevor Swerdfager (Director General, Canadian Wildlife Service,
Environmental Conservation Service, Department of the Environment).
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was a perceived gap in the exercise of port state and coastal state enforcement.
The federal government justified the tougher sanctions in the interest of
conformity with the contemporary shipping business, change of the risk-benefit
assessment of polluting, and harmonisation of sanctions with those imposed in
the United States to ensure that polluters no longer enjoy safe haven.109
Political will ensured that the proposed legislation passed, but concerns
were expressed. The role of Environment Canada as the lead agency was
clarified. The power of arrest, entry, search and seizure, detention, and direction
of movement to vessels in the Canadian EEZ was extended.110 Tougher
sanctions were introduced and new penalties for tampering with or destruction
of records were added to penalties for discharges, all to deter shipowners and
operators from discharging pollutants in Canadian waters.111 There were issues
of consistency with MARPOL commitments. At the same time, Courts were
provided with sentencing guidelines.112 The bill contained hasty and vague
drafting and could have given better consideration to the problem of legislative
and institutional overlaps in Canada’s vessel-source pollution regime.
Most significantly, strict and vicarious liability provisions applicable to
masters and chief engineers, owners, operators, or directors of the corporate
owner, with imprisonment as penalty, was legislated.113 The hope was that
these measures would encourage whistle-blowing and strengthen the
evidentiary base for the prosecution of offences. The new criminal offences
109

In a subsequent declaration, the Minister of Environment added: “The European Union is
preparing legislation that will have about the same effect as Bill C-15. We are going in the same
direction according to international law and international morality.” Hon. Stephan Dion,
“Announcing the proclamation of the Migratory Birds Convention Act and the Canadian
Environmental Protection Act as Amended by Bill C-15” (St. John’s Newfoundland, 25 June
2005), available: <http://www.ec.gc.ca/media_archive/minister/speeches/2005/050625_s_
e.htm> (retrieved 10 November 2008).
110
MBCA, n. 72 above, s. 2.1 and 18.3.
111
The MBCA now provides for convictions on indictment a maximum fine of CAD1 million
and, if the vessel is over 5000 DWT a minimum of CAD500,000, and imprisonment for up to
three years, or both, for vessels caught depositing o permitting harmful substances to be
deposited, whether accidental or intentionally, regardless of amount, in areas frequented by
migratory birds. The same punishment is applicable for the destruction or alteration of the
vessel’s records. The only defence available is that of due diligence. MBCA, n. 72 above, s.
13(1.1), 13(1.11), 13(1.8).
112
Id., s. 13(4.1).
113
Id., s. 5.4-5.5 and 13(1.6)–13(1.7). Under the MBCA, the accused must establish that he
took all reasonable care to avoid the commission of the offence by others on board the vessel;
such vicarious strict liability is unprecedented in Canadian law. S. Kirby, “The Criminalization
of Seafarers Involved in Marine Pollution Incidents” (2008) (unpublished), p. 24. Corporate
liability is found in the proposed amendments of the EU Ship Source Pollution Directive
(2005/35/EC).
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could potentially infringe on the human rights of seafarers, who are invariably
more visible than the shipowners. However, no such convictions have as yet
occurred.114 While much has been said about the rising trend of criminalisation
of seafarers in Canada, it would appear that seafarers have been faced with the
prospect of criminal liability for such offences since the inception of marine
pollution regulation. Although there was a brief period during the 1970s in
which shipping interests succeeded in removing the possibility of imprisonment
for pollution offences, the victory was only brief, and perhaps the only
remaining example of such legislation is found in the Arctic Waters Pollution
Prevention Act (AWPPA).
Vessel-source pollution offences are also established and enforced under
other statutes. Contemporaneous and parallel amendments to the Canadian
Environmental Protection Act, 1999 establish similar sanctions for the disposal
or incineration of polluting substances at sea, import or export of pollutants for
disposal at sea, and the loading of a substance onto a ship for disposal at sea,
unless done with a permit.115 As mentioned earlier, vessel-source pollution
prosecutions may also be pursued under the Fisheries Act, implementation
responsibility for which rests with DFO, and enforcement with Environment
Canada. The Act prohibits “throwing prejudicial or deleterious substances
overboard” or depositing such substances in fish habitats.116 It also establishes
a duty to report an incident of pollution and to take measures to minimise the
effects.117 Tough sanctions similar to those under the AWPPA and CEPA are
imposed, possibly because of the socio-economic significance of fisheries for
the Canadian economy. The Canada National Marine Conservation Areas
Act,118 provides similar offences and sanctions for discharges in conservation
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Kirby, id., p. 25, citing pers. comm. with James Martin, Federal Department of Justice
(20 May 2008).
115
CEPA, n. 69 above, Part VIII, Div. 3 – Disposal at Sea and s. 272. In addition, CEPA
contains a broad prohibition against intentional or reckless damage to the environment (causing
a disaster) and risk of death or harm to person, contravention of which may be punished on
indictment by a fine without maximum limits and/or up to five years imprisonment or on
summary conviction with a fine up to CAD300,000 or imprisonment up to six months, or both.
CEPA, s. 274(1).
116
A contravention may be punished on indictment by a fine up to CAD1 million, in the case of
a first offence and in the case of subsequent offences to the same fine plus imprisonment for up
to three years. If the offence is prosecuted on summary conviction, first time offenders may be
punished by a fine up to CAD300,000 and subsequently by fine or imprisonment up to six
months or both.
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Failure to do so may be punished on summary conviction by a fine up to CAD200,000 for a
first offence and fine plus imprisonment up to six months for subsequent offences.
118
Canada National Marine Conservation Areas Act, S.C. 2002, c. 18 [hereinafter NMCA].
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areas.119 Discharges in Arctic waters are enforced by Transport Canada by
virtue of the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act and the Arctic Shipping
Pollution Prevention Regulations.120 Inter alia, the AWPPA prohibits all waste
disposal into Arctic waters and permits the removal or destruction of any
vessel, cargo, or bunkers when a serious pollution discharge occurs.121
Curiously, and inconsistently, the AWPPA marine pollution sanctions appear to
be less severe than those under the Canada Shipping Act, 2001, the Migratory
Birds Convention Act, and Canadian Environment Protection Act.122 This
situation is inconsistent with the particular needs and difficulties of protecting
the sensitive Arctic marine environment. Consistent, if not tougher sanctions,
are likely justifiable to enhance deterrence and heighten vessel operational
standards in a remote region where pollution response and monitoring are
extremely difficult, at best.
It is appropriate to enquire to what extent this legislative activity has
managed to harmonise overlapping statutes addressing vessel-source pollution
and equally overlapping mandates of multiple federal departments. Although
the Canada Shipping Act, 2001 streamlined the prosecution of offences by
providing only for summary conviction offences, that new and innovative effort
was not carried through to the Fisheries Act, Bill C-15, and the National
Marine Conservation Areas Act. The latter two continue to provide for
prosecution by indictment or summary conviction. Despite serious concerns in
the shipping and legal community about Bill C-15’s vicarious strict liability
offences and stiff sanctions, in practice most oil pollution offences have been
prosecuted by Transport Canada under the Canada Shipping Act, 2001 or the
Fisheries Act, rather than under the Migratory Birds Convention Act or the
Canadian Environmental Protection Act.123 Since 1996, Environment Canada
119

This Act punishes anyone who disposes of pollutant substances in a marine conservation
area; offenders may be punished by indictment to a fine up to CAD500,000 and on summary
conviction to a fine of up to CAD100,000. NMCA, id., s. 24(1).
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Arctic Shipping Pollution Prevention Regulations, C.R.C., c. 354.
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It also permits seizure and forfeiture of ship and equipment in cases of pollution offences.
AWPPA, n. 55 above, s. 23 et seq.
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The AWWPA provides for summary conviction offences punishable by a fine of up to
CAD500,000 if the offender is an individual and CAD100,000 if the offender is a ship. Id., s.
18.
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Marine Pollution Prevention, “Successful Prosecutions - Marine Pollution Prevention (2000–
2007)” (June 2007), available: <http://www.marinepollution-pollutionmaritime.gc.ca/eng/
succes_pros/prosecutions/menu.htm> (retrieved 10 November 2008) [hereinafter Successful
Prosecutions]. See also statistics published by Environment Canada, Enforcement Branch,
“National Statistics, Legal Activities Report, and Annual Reports for CEPA and FA,” available:
<http://www.ec.gc.ca/alef-ewe/default.asp?lang=En&n=5C63F879-1> (retrieved 10 November
2008) [hereinafter Environment Canada, “Statistics”].
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has charged only five vessels under the Migratory Birds Convention Act.124 Of
these, only one was convicted under that Act.125 In the other cases, federal
prosecutors preferred to proceed under the Canada Shipping Act, 2001 for
various reasons.126 Further, to date only one master has been charged and fined
for an oil pollution offence under the Canada Shipping Act, 2001.127
Imprisonment has not been applied. Considering the political fanfare
accompanying Bill C-15, in hindsight it appears that the principal effect has
been to “send a message” to the shipping community and to assuage public
concern. Government wanted to be seen to be “getting tough on polluters.”
However, the significance of the Bill C-15 amendments should not be
underestimated. The enhanced sanctions therein accompany the practice of
Canadian courts to progressively increase the fines assessed for pollution
incidents and orders to pay contributions into the Environmental Damages
Fund.128

124

These were: Elm, Brandenburg, Atlantic Cartier, Donau Ore, and Sandviken. F. Wiese,
Seabirds and Atlantic Canada’s Ship-Source Oil Pollution: Impacts, Trends, and Solutions
(World Wildlife Fund, 2002), p. 23.
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The M/V Donau Ore. A fine of CAD30,500 was paid after the owners pleaded guilty.
Environment Canada, “Government of Canada announces successful prosecution of marine oil
polluter,” News Release (21 March 2001), available: <http://www.ns.ec.gc.ca/press/01-0321.html> (retrieved 10 November 2008). It will be noted that this conviction precedes the
enactment of Bill C-15. Similarly, there appear to be no prosecutions for disposal at sea or
ocean dumping offences under CEPA, and only one Environmental Protection Compliance
Order (EPCO) issued. Environment Canada, “Statistics,” n. 123 above at CEPA 1999 for Fiscal
Year 2004–2005. See also letter from Chuck Brumwell (Environment Canada, MGP Review
Manager) to Paula Pacholek (7 November 2006) regarding Environment Canada’s Response to
the Joint Review Panel’s Information Request JRP_R5_10, available:
<http://www.ngps.nt.ca/Upload/Interveners/Environment%20Canada/061107_EC%20IR%20R
esponse%205%2010.pdf> (retrieved 10 November 2008).
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Wiese, n. 124 above.
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Successful Prosecutions, n. 123 above. Prosecution of F/V Hime Maru and its Master for Oil
Record Book violations. See also Transport Canada, “Precedent Set as Marine Polluter Ordered
to Pay Substantial Penalty,” News Release No. A001/05 (14 February 2005), available:
<http://www.tc.gc.ca/mediaroom/releases/atl/2005/05-a001e.htm> (retrieved 10 November
2008).
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Successful Prosecutions, id. See, e.g., most recent incidents with respect to the jackup oil rig Rowan Gorilla VI (prosecuted March 2007, CAD70,000 fine imposed, CAD35,000
going to EDF), the M/V Point Valiant (prosecuted November 8, 2007, CAD18,000 fine
imposed, CAD10,000 going to the EDF) and the M/V Cicero (prosecuted April 17, 2008,
CAD15,000 fine imposed, CAD10,000 were paid in the EDF). The EDF adds a restorative
component to vessel-source pollution sanctions.
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17.6.2.2. Places of Refuge for Ships in Need of Assistance
The international custom of granting refuge to ships in distress has been
recognised in Canada at least since the 18th century.129 Canadian courts have
enforced the international custom in a domestic context at least from the last
quarter of the 19th century.130 In more recent times, ships in distress have been
permitted to enter a Canadian port as a place of refuge only after their
threatening condition was stabilised.131 This practice is consistent with that of
other maritime states. While on the one hand recognising the humanitarian right
of a ship in need of assistance to enter a place of refuge, Canada also takes the
steps necessary to protect its interests, which may also include directing the
ship to a particular location or possibly, in rare situations, to refuse admission.
Canada supported efforts in the IMO to develop and adopt the 2003 Guidelines
on Places of Refuge for Ships in Need of Assistance as an attempt to
standardise international practice and the use of a risk assessment framework.132
Following the adoption of the IMO Guidelines, Canada embarked on a lengthy
process to develop the National Places of Refuge Contingency Plan (PORCP),
which was finalised in 2007.133 Overall, the adoption of the PORCP in Canada
was a relatively straightforward, non-contentious task, unlike the EU where
public concern has delayed the adoption of a further directive in the Erika III
package addressing this issue. The purpose of the PORCP is “to establish
a national framework and approach which, with associated regional measures,
will provide for an effective and efficient response to requests from ships in
need of assistance seeking a place of refuge.” Based on the IMO Guidelines,
129

Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation between His Britannick Majesty and the United
States of America, London, 19 November 1794, Parry, Vol. 52 (1969), Article 23, p. 243. For
a historical assessment of the custom, see: A. Chircop, “Ships in Distress, Environmental
Threats to Coastal States, and Places of Refuge: New Directions for an Ancien Regime?” Ocean
Development and International Law 33, no. 2 (2002): 207–226, p. 208; and by the same author,
“The Customary Law of Refuge for Ships in Distress,” in A. Chircop and O. Linden, eds,
Places of Refuge for Ships: Emerging Environmental Concerns of a Maritime Custom (Leiden:
Nijhoff, 2005), pp. 161–229.
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Canada (Attorney-General) v. MacDonell, (1883), 1 Ex. C. R. 99; Canada v. Valiant (The)
(1914), 15 Ex. C. R. 392; May (The) v. Canada, [1931] S. C. R. 374; Queen City (The) v.
Canada, [1931] S.C. R. 387; Canada (Attorney-General) v. Natalie S. (The), [1932] Ex. C. R.
155; Rex v. Flahaut, [1935] 2 D.L.R. 685.
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The Eastern Power (leaking oil, 2000) and the M/V Kitano (fire onboard, 2001) entered
ports of refuge in Atlantic Canada in such circumstances. “Canada to let leaking oil tanker in
Newfoundland,” CBC News Update, 9 December 2000; “Ship ‘safe’ to enter harbour,” Halifax
Chronicle Herald, 24 March 2001.
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Guidelines on Places of Refuge for Ships in Need of Assistance, IMO Assembly Resolution
A.949(23), adopted on 5 December 2003, IMO Doc. A 23/RES.949, 5 March 2004.
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Transport Canada, National Places of Refuge Contingency Plan (PORCP) (3 July 2007).
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but contextualised for Canada, the PORCP aims at promoting a consistent
approach to a national response plan for Canada’s oceans. By identifying the
responsible authority for providing assistance, Canada also appears to have
implemented an IMO resolution accompanying the Guidelines concerning
maritime assistance services.134 PORCP has been prepared by Transport
Canada and within it the regional Marine Safety directors are expected to
engage in a thorough and balanced risk assessment exercise as a basis for
a timely decision on providing safe assistance to such ships, refuge as may be
appropriate, and any related conditions.

17.6.2.3. Pollution Liability and Compensation Regime
Canada has long been a party to the CLC and IOPCF conventions, and has
recently become a party to the LLMC. Canada is not yet a party to HNS and
Bunkers, but neither convention is yet in force. Under Canadian law,
a shipowner who is not covered by the CLC Convention (e.g., he is flying the
flag of a non-party) is entitled to claim limitation of liability under the LLMC.
This is similar to other jurisdictions. However, the two most significant aspects
of Canada’s pollution liability and compensation regime, and a significant
departure from the practice of EU Member States, are (1) standing
arrangements with response organisations and (2) Canada’s long-standing ShipSource Oil Pollution Fund (SOPF).
In its attempt to implement the polluter pays principle in relation to
accidental oil pollution, Canada introduced a system of private responders
across the country who would be equipped and certified as institutions with
whom persons trading in oil in Canadian waters would be required to enter into
a standing arrangement.135 The idea is that private response organisations would
take on much of the response work of the Canadian Coast Guard, for a fee, and
be available to respond promptly. They would operate under the authority of the
master of the vessel that needs such assistance. Response organisations are
entitled to claim their intervention costs as described further below.
134

Maritime Assistance Services, IMO Assembly Resolution A.950, adopted on 5 December
2003, IMO Doc. A 23/Res.950, 26 February 2004.
135
CSA 2001, n. 34 above, ss. 167–171. See further Response Organizations and Oil Handling
Facilities Regulations, SOR/95-405; Transport Canada, Response Organizations Standards, TP
12401 (Transport Canada, 1995), available: <http://www.tc.gc.ca/marinesafety/tp/TP12401/
menu.htm> (retrieved 10 November 2008). See generally, Transport Canada, Environmental
Response Systems: Managing Canada’s Marine Oil Spill Preparedness and Response Regime,
TP 14471 (Transport Canada, 2006), available: <http://www.tc.gc.ca/marinesafety/TP/
TP14471/menu.htm> (retrieved 10 November 2008).
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Originally established in 1973 as the Marine Pollution Claims Fund in
response to the Arrow casualty, the SOPF was launched in 1989 and is probably
the first compensation fund for marine oil pollution damage that is separate
from, but complements, the international liability and compensation regime.136
The SOPF interweaves with the CLC and IOPCF regimes, and to a lesser extent
with the LLMC, which are implemented through the Marine Liability Act and
regulations.137 The shipowner remains the first line of liability within the strict
liability limits based on tonnage of the ship set out in the CLC, with the second
line of liability consisting of the cargo-owners share in the form of the IOPCF,
liability under which is also governed by the principle of strict liability.138 In
a suit for compensation, the directors of the IOPCF and SOPF are joined to the
suit by law.
The SOPF interacts with this combined regime in a number of ways.
First, the SOPF is responsible for the imported oil contribution calls which are
at the basis of the IOPCF. This is in contrast to the other IOPCF state parties,
who have legislated direct contributions from qualifying major oil importers in
their jurisdictions.139 Second, the SOPF covers a wider range of spills than the
international regime. Any ship qualifies (not just tankers), the oil covered is not
restricted to persistent oils, and the polluting oil does not need to be carried as
cargo. CLC is limited to cargo, bunker oil, and slops. Third, the claims covered
are similar to the CLC and IOPCF, such as oil pollution damage, and cleanup
costs (including reasonable preventive measures, actually incurred). Pollution
damage and cleanup where the ship’s identity is not established, such as
mystery spills are covered, unlike the CLC and IOPCF. Anticipatory and
remedial expenses are covered.140 Economic loss claims are also covered, but
136

K. A. MacInnis, “The Canadian SSOPF Fund and Environmental Damage Assessment
(EDA) in Canada,” in F. Maes, ed., Marine Resource Damage Assessment: Liability and
Compensation for Environmental Damage (Dordrecht: Springer, 2005), pp. 67–84.
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Marine Liability Regulations, SOR/2002-307 (8 August 2002).
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The only conduct that bars limitation is a “Personal act or omission of the owner, committed
with the intent to cause the oil pollution damage or recklessly and with knowledge that the oil
pollution damage would probably result.” CLC, n. 51 above, and Marine Liability Act, n. 35
above. The “owner” includes shipowner, ship operator, and person who has possession or
control of ship.
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Since 1989, the SOPF has contributed over CAD42 million in calls to the IOPCF. ShipSource Oil Pollution Fund (SOPF), The Administrator’s Annual Report 2006–2007 (Ottawa:
SOPF, 2007), p. i.
140
Costs and expenses incurred by the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans, response organisation,
any other person in Canada “in respect of measures to prevent, repair, remedy or minimise oil
pollution damage from the ship, including measures taken in anticipation of a discharge of oil
from that ship, to the extent that the measures taken and the costs and expenses are reasonable,
and for any loss or damage caused by such measures,” and costs and expenses of the Minister
or any person directed to take action or otherwise. Marine Liability Act, n. 35 above, s. 51.
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they are limited to those connected with loss of income from fisheries
(including sport fishing, and workers involved in handling and processing),
aquaculture, and subsistence hunting in Canada. This is significantly narrower
than the CLC and IOPCF parameters. In any case, claimants must show that
they have no other right of recovery under any other law, and relational
economic loss is not covered.141 Fourth, the SOPF is a fund of both first and last
resort for Canadian claimants. Canadian claimants, except response
organisations, may file a claim against the SOPF in an administrative
procedure, so that they avoid the cumbersome judicial procedure of a suit
against the shipowner and the IOPCF. The SOPF would then be subrogated into
their claim against the shipowner and the IOPCF. Empowered as
a commissioner under the Inquiries Act,142 the SOPF Administrator will
investigate and assess all claims, and in practice rarely grants the entire amount
claimed. The Administrator will make an offer to the claimant. If the claimant
is dissatisfied, s/he will still have the right to appeal the Administrator’s
decision to the Federal Court.
Originally, the SOPF consisted of the receipts from a legally imposed
levy of CAD 45.61 cents per metric ton of imported or exported oil in Canada.
However, this levy was discontinued in 1976 as it was thought sufficient funds
had accumulated to cover the claims that could arise. Although the idea of reintroducing the levy has surfaced from time to time, it has not been reestablished. The SOPF has remained self-sufficient and has thus been able to
pay off claims from its own growth. At the end of March 2008, the SOPF
accumulated surplus stood at CAD376,425,567, with CAD152,110,416 being
available for all claims from one major spill. This amount is significant when it
is considered that it complements the CLC and IOPCF amounts. Thus a major
spill that would necessitate combined compensation efforts would have
CAD495,257,000 for claims. However, it is possible these funds might not be
sufficient for a Prestige type scenario, and consequently it has been proposed
that Canada should join the 2003 IOPC Protocol.143 Cleanup costs in the cases
of Prestige and the earlier Exxon Valdez exceeded USD2 billion each;
a Prestige scenario in Canada has been estimated at USD1.5 billion. Under the
2003 protocol, combined CLC and IOPCF compensation amounts would be in
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This is similar in all three funds, based on the pragmatic rule and principle of remoteness.
See Landcatch v. IOPC Fund, 1999 SLT 1208 (Court of Session: Inner House (Second
Division).
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Inquiries Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-11.
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Transport Canada, Maritime Law Reform Discussion Paper, TP 14370E (May 2005),
available: <http://www.tc.gc.ca/pol/en/Report/tp14370/menu.htm> (retrieved 10 November
2008), p. 14.
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the region of CAD1.3 billion, thus bringing compensation levels closer to those
of the United States’ Oil Pollution Act of 1990.
In comparison, the EU does not have an EU-wide compensation fund,
although it did obtain a higher level of compensation by successfully lobbying
for the 2003 IOPCF Protocol. Nevertheless, some Member States, such as
Finland, do have a separate national fund similar to the SOPF.

17.7. Conclusion
In general, and like EU Member States, Canada has pursued its shipping and
marine environment protection interests within the global international
maritime law regime serviced by IMO. Canada has been an active participant,
frequently taking initiatives that have produced change in international
regulations and standards. Canada has been able to do so even though it has not
always embraced international conventions in a timely manner, if at all.
However, its approach to the implementation of international standards has
generally been solid: Canada has tended to legislate the amendments prior to or
at the same time as it became a party to an international convention.
In a contemporary setting, Canadian policy and regulation making for
maritime safety and marine pollution, frequently under pressure from
stakeholders and lack of resources, strives to produce results in an efficient
(cost-effective) manner. Current policies are ostensibly geared towards the
achievement of outcomes. It may be too soon to determine the extent to which
intended results are being achieved, as the expected outcomes speak to
medium- to long-term change. For successful results-based management, it
should be expected that institutional efforts should be proactive. The Canadian
experience appears to be more a mixture of proactive and reactive policy,
institutional, and regulatory responses. The Canada Shipping Act, 2001 reform
process can be seen as a proactive approach to legislative modernisation.
Similarly, the PORCP constitutes proactive planning for the likelihood that
ships in need of assistance that may pose environmental and other threats might
require and be given refuge in Canadian waters. Differently, the complicated
legislative response to oil pollution as a result of illegal discharges from ships is
indicative of a reactive approach. It is arguable that reactive approaches are less
efficient than well-thought-out proactive approaches which are spared
development under the heat of the moment. In this example, the response to oil
pollution has produced a fragmented, laborious, and inefficient approach to
dealing with the problem.
A handicap Canadian maritime administration has laboured under since
the 1990s is the split of maritime responsibilities between two departments, and
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especially the migration of the Canadian Coast Guard from the core of the
maritime administration. The issue of conflicting institutional cultures has not
been resolved, and will likely not be resolved. The approach to maritime
administration remains unnecessarily fragmented.
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Annex. Ship Pollution Offences in Canada (all figures in CAD)
Statute
& Regulations
Oceans
Act

CSA
2001
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Offences
Carry out any activity — including
depositing, discharging or dumping any
substance, or causing any substance to
be deposited, discharged or dumped —
that is likely to result in the
disturbance, damage, destruction or
removal of a living marine organism or
any part of its habitat.
(various Marine Protected Areas
Regulations, made pursuant to s. 35(3)
Oceans Act)
Failure to: (s. 183(1))
• Have arrangement with RO
• Have procedures, equipment and
resources for immediate use
• Implement oil pollution prevention
plan
• Implement oil pollution emergency
plan
• Have equipment and resources at the
site
• Implement response plan
• Obey direction resulting from
a discharge or possible discharge of
a pollutant
Failure to: (s. 184(1))
• Have a declaration on board
• Have a declaration on site
• Have oil pollution prevention plan
on site
• Have oil pollution emergency plan
on site
• Have a response plan
• Provide or arrange for training
• Undertake and participate in
activities to evaluate response plan
• Provide information
• Provide information officer
considers appropriate
• Obey directions given under s.

Sanctions
Summary conviction:
Fine max. $100,000
Indictment:
Fine max. $500,000
(s. 37)

Summary conviction:
Fine max. $1 million
and/or imprisonment
maximum 18 months
(s. 183(2))

Enforcement
Responsibility

DFO names
“enforcement
officers”
(s. 39)

TC names
“Pollution
Prevention
Officers”
(s. 174)
DFO names
“Pollution
Response
Officers”
(s. 174.1)

Summary conviction:
Fine maximum
$100,000 and/or
imprisonment
maximum 1 year
(s. 184(2))

TC & DFO
s. 175.1(2)
Powers of
PRO re
discharges

175(1)(b)(c)(d) or (e) and
176(1)(b)(c) or (d)
• Illegal discharge of pollutant (s.
187)
• Failure to implement shipboard oil
pollution emergency plan (s. 188)

Summary conviction:
• Fine maximum
$1 million and/or
imprisonment
maximum 18 months
(s. 191)

TC
(s. 185)

• Failure to proceed to a place and
unload a pollutant (s. 189)
• Contravention of the regulations
made under this Part (s. 190)
Regulations include:
• Carrying of pollutants on board a
vessel, whether as cargo or fuel
• Control and prevention of pollution
of the air by vessels
• Reception facilities
• Ballast water management
• Design, construction, manufacture
and maintenance of vessels or
classes of vessels
• Inspecting and testing
• Obtaining certificates
Failure to obey directions: (s. 189)
• To provide information
• To proceed by a specified route
• To proceed to a place and remain
there
• Intentionally or recklessly causing a
disaster that results in the loss of life
or serious damage to the
environment (s. 253(1)(a))
MBCA

• Depositing or permitting harmful
substances to be deposited
in waters or an area frequented by
migratory birds or in a place from
which the substance may enter such
waters or such an area (s. 5.1)

Summary conviction:
• Fine maximum
$100,000 (s. 192)

Indictment:
• Fine (no limits)
and/or imprisonment
maximum 5 years
(s. 53)
Indictment:
• Fine maximum
$1 million and/or
imprisonment
maximum 3 years
• If vessel over
5000 DWT
minimum fine
$500,000

EC:
• Game
Officers
• RMCP
(s. 6(1))

Summary conviction:
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FA

• Destruction or alteration of records
• Omissions or false entries in records.
• Obstruction of Game Officers
• Providing false or misleading
information (s. 5.2)
• Throwing prejudicial or deleterious
substances (incl. ballast, coal ashes,
stones) overboard
in any river, harbour or roadstead, or in
any water where fishing is carried on
(s. 36(1))

• Depositing or permitting deposit of
deleterious substances of any type in
water frequented by fish or in any
place under any conditions where the
deleterious substance or any other
deleterious substance that results
from the deposit of the deleterious
substance may enter any such water
(s. 36(3))
• Failure to report deposits of
deleterious substances that occur “out
of normal course of events” (s. 38(4))
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• Fine max. $300,000
and/or imprisonment
maximum 6 months
• If vessel over
5000 DWT
minimum fine
$100,000
(ss. 13(1.1), (1.11))
Ibid.

Indictment:
• First offence: fine
maximum $1 million
• Subsequent offence:
fine maximum
$1 million and/or
imprisonment
maximum 3 years
Summary conviction:
• First offence: fine
maximum $300,000
• Subsequent offence:
fine maximum
$300,000 and/or
imprisonment
maximum 6 months
(s. 40(2))
Ibid.

Summary conviction:
• First offence: fine
max. $200,000
• Subsequent offence,
fine max. $200,000
and/or imprisonment
maximum 6 months
(s. 40(3))

EC per MOU
with DFO

CEPA

• Failure to take reasonable measures to
mitigate or remedy adverse effects of
deposits regarding s. 38(4) (s. 38(5))
• Failure to comply with direction of
inspectors re deposit per s. 38(4)
(s. 8(6))
• Disposal or incineration of substances
at sea
• Importation or exportation of a
substance for disposal at sea
• Loading of a substance onto a ship for
disposal at sea unless done with a
permit (Part VIII Div. 3 – Disposal at
Sea)

• Failure to prepare and implement
environmental emergency plans in
respect of listed substances (s. 199)
• Failure to report and minimise
environmental emergency in respect
of listed substances (s. 201)
• Intentional or reckless damage to
environment (causing disaster)
(s. 274(1)(a))
NMCA

• Disposal of any substance
(s. 14)
within a marine conservation area
except as authorised under CEPA

• Failure to mitigate degradation or
injury caused by discharge or deposit
of a substance capable of degrading
the environment or injuring any
animal, fish or plant within a marine
conservation area (s. 29(1))

AWPPA

• Failure to comply with
Minister’s irections (s. 29(2))
• Deposit of waste of any type (s. 4(1))
in the Arctic waters or in any place on

Ibid.

Ibid.

Indictment:
• Fine maximum
$1 million and/or
imprisonment
maximum 3 years

EC

Summary conviction:
• Fine maximum
$300,000 and/or
imprisonment
maximum 6 months
(s. 272)
Ibid.

Indictment:
• Fine (no limit) and/or
imprisonment
maximum 5 years
Indictment:
• Fine maximum
$500,000

Parks Canada
Agency

Summary conviction:
• Fine maximum
$100,000 (s. 24(1))
Ibid. (s. 24(1))

Summary conviction:
• Individual: fine
maximum $5,000

TC named
Pollution
Prevention
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the mainland or islands of the Canadian
Arctic under any conditions where the
waste or any other waste that results
from the deposit of the waste may enter
the Arctic waters
• Failure to report deposit of waste or
accident or other occurrence (s. 5(1))
• Failure to provide evidence of
financial responsibility when required
(s. 8(1))
• Navigating in shipping safety control
zone without meeting standards
• Navigating in shipping safety control
zone contrary to regulations
• Failure to comply with reasonable
directions given by pilot
• Failure to comply with orders given
by pollution prevention officer in
response to deposits or threat of
deposit
• Failure to report deposit (master of
ship)
• Obstructing PPO or making false
statements (master of ship)
• Obstructing or hindering a pollution
prevention officer (other than master)
• Making false or misleading
statements to a pollution prevention
officer (other than master) (s. 17)

• Ship: fine maximum
$100,000 (s. 18)

Summary conviction:
• Fine maximum
$25,000 (s. 19(1))

Officers
per
Governor in
Council
Authority
Delegation
Order
(C.R.C., c.
355)

Summary conviction:
• Fine maximum
$25,000 (s. 19(2))

Summary conviction
(no minimum/
maximum)

Key: CEPA, Canadian Environmental Protection Act; CSA, Canada Shipping Act, 2001; DFO,
Department of Fisheries and Oceans; EC, Environment Canada; FA, Fisheries Act; MBCA,
Migratory Birds Convention Act; MOU, memorandum of understanding; NMCA, Canada
National Marine Conservation Areas Act; PRO, pollution response officer; PPO, pollution
prevention officer; RO, response organisation; TC, Transport Canada.
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Workshop Discussion Summary
Management of Maritime Safety and Vessel-Source Pollution
Susan Rolston

Moira McConnell, Marine & Environment Law Institute, Dalhousie University
(making a joint presentation on behalf of Lotta Viikari, Faculty of Law,
University of Lapland); Malgorzata Nesterowicz, European Maritime Safety
Agency; and Aldo Chircop and Eric Machum, Marine & Environment Law
Institute, Dalhousie University, presented their papers focussing on invasive
species and ships’ ballast water, and maritime safety and vessel-source
pollution control from both Canadian and EU perspectives.
Discussion centered on the issue of transport of alien species, including
the unaddressed issue of transport of introduction of alien species to land as a
result of maritime transport (e.g., introduced beetles from wooden shipping
platforms). It was agreed that we must also consider the issue from the
perspective of what we are exporting, and identify means of reducing the
transport of invasive species from this perspective.
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